48 سال قبل آج کے دن بھارت نے پاکستان پر بھرپور حملہ کیا تھا ۔ اس حملے کے پیش رو ”آپریشن جبرالٹر“ اور اس کی ناکامی کی وجوہات پر میں پہلے لکھ چکا ہوں ۔ 1965ء میں افواجِ پاکستان کے کمانڈر انچیف جنرل موسٰی کی تحریر اُس وقت میری نظر سے نہ گذرنے کے باعث رہ گئی تھی ۔ پڑھتے ہوئے یہ ذہن میں رہے کہ 1965ء میں وزیرِ خارجہ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو تھے جو جنرل ایوب خان کے بہت قریب تھے یہاں تک کہ ایوب خان کو ڈَیڈ کہہ کر مخاطب کرتے تھے ۔ ذوالفقار علی بھٹو ہی نے جنرل ایوب خان کو باور کرایا تھا کہ اِدھر سے حملہ ہوتے ہی جموں کشمیر کے لوگ اُٹھ کھڑے ہوں گے اور بھارت گھُٹنے ٹیک دے گا
جنرل موسٰی لکھتے ہیں
“After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major-General Akhtar Husain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code- named ‘GIBRALTAR’, in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified.
“It was not due to lack of valour or determination on the part of all those who took part in the operation, or their capacity to sustain great physical hardships nor to faulty planning and ineffective leadership at the various levels of command that the raids eventually petered out. Primarily, the reason was lack of necessary preparations in the valley for the extremely difficult tasks before they were undertaken. GHQ had clearly and repeatedly highlighted this vital aspect of it and their opposition to the Foreign Office proposal was based, mainly, on it.
“We hadn’t even consulted the public leaders across the cease-fire line about our aims and intention, let alone associating them with our planning for the clandestine war. They had to have a proper organization in the valley, which should have jointly planned the operation with us and should have remained in touch with us after it was started, so as to coordinate their activities with ours.
As GHQ had assessed, and the operation proved, the Muslim population there, although, by and large, willing to help were unable to cooperate with us fully. Firstly, because they were not mentally prepared for it and, secondly, due to the presence of nearly five Indian infantry divisions and strong civil armed forces in occupied Kashmir they could not embark on such missions. In the circumstances in which we went in, it was pure wishful thinking on anyone’s part to expect them to risk their lives by trying to give us more than very limited support for a vague purpose in which they had practically no say.
“Because of the haste with which the operation was launched, even Azad Kashmir leaders were not taken into confidence by the advocates of guerilla raids. Helplessly, they remained in the background. Their co-operation was also very necessary and would have been very helpful. They could have assisted the Mujahidin in various ways by themselves and in conjunction with the Kashmiris of the valley.